

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 05443 181945Z

21

ACTION EUR-08

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 NEA-06 L-01 H-02 INR-05 PM-03

PRS-01 SP-02 NSC-05 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00 SAB-01

SAJ-01 SAM-01 EB-03 ACDA-10 /064 W

----- 079136

R 181634Z APR 75

FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9439

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

AMEMBASSY CAIRO

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS

AMEMBASSY JIDDA

AMCONSUL LENINGRAD

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 5443

LIMDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: PFOR, UR, IZ

SUBJECT: SADDAM HUSSEIN'S MOSCOW VISIT

BEIRUT PASS BAGHDAD

REF: A. MOSCOW 5288; B. MOSCOW 5284

1. SUMMARY AND COMMENT. INDICATIONS THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN'S MOSCOW VISIT WAS CUT SHORT AND ABSENCE OF ANY APPARENT SIGNIFICANT RESULTS FROM VISIT SUGGEST THAT SOVIET-IRAQI TALKS PRODUCED NO BREAKTHROUGHTS IN SOVIET-IRAQI RELATIONS. SOVIET-IRAQI JOINT COMMUNIQUE (PRAVDA APRIL 17) ANNOUNCES THAT IN ADDITION TO TWO BILATERAL ACCORDS (REFTEL A)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 MOSCOW 05443 181945Z

PARTIES AGREED "TO WORK OUT" PROSPECTS FOR ECONOMIC

COOPERATION AND TRADE. HOWEVER, THERE IS NO INDICATION THAT ACTUAL AGREEMENT TO INCREASE OR UPGRADE TRADE WAS REACHED. COMMUNIQUE DOES NOT MENTION DEFENSE COOPERATION, ALTHOUGH WE UNDERSTAND AN IRAQI MILITARY DELEGATION PRECEDED SADDAM TO MOSCOW IN ORDER TO NEGOTIATE PROBLEMS WITH ARMS DELIVERIES.

2. ON INTERNATIONAL MATTERS THE SOVIETS "EXPRESSED SATISFACTION" AT THE IRAQ-IRAN AGREEMENT BUT THIS SEEMS THE MINIMUM THEY COULD SAY. JORDANIAN EMBOFF TELLS US THAT SOVIET INSISTENCE ON "A FULL EXPLANATION" OF THE IRAQ-IRAN ACCORD WAS THE MAIN PURPOSE OF SADDAM HUSSEIN'S VISIT. COMMUNIQUE DOES NOT MENTION THE KURDISH QUESTION, BUT WE SUSPECT THE IRAQIS WERE ANNOYED AT KOSYGIN'S APRIL 14 PONTIFICATION ABOUT THE NATIONALITIES QUESTION. JORDANIAN TELLS US MOREOVER THAT PRAVDA ABBREVIATED SADDAM HUSSEIN'S REMARKS ABOUT THE KURDS, SUGGESTING IRAQI'S COMMENTS MAY HAVE CAUSED THE SOVIETS SOME DISCOMFORT. ON OTHER INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS THE COMMUNIQUE APPEARS TO REFLECT COMPROMISE LANGUAGE DESIGNED TO PAPER OVER LONG-STANDING DIFFERENCES. MIDDLE EAST PORTION IS BASICALLY IDENTICAL TO PREVIOUS JOINT SOVIET-IRAQ STATEMENTS, INDICATING THAT NEITHER SIDE MOVED SIGNIFICANTLY ON THIS ISSUE. SOVIETS APPARENTLY TONED DOWN IRAQI LANGUAGE ON THREATS AGAINST OIL PRODUCERS AND THEREIS NO DIRECT REFERENCE TO THE U.S. IN SUM, WE DOUBT THAT THOSE GLUM EXPRESSIONS ON EAST EUROPEAN FACES IN BAGHDAD ARE LIKELY TO BLOSSOM INTO SMILES AS A RESULT OF SADDAM HUSSEIN'S SEEMINGLY CONFIDENT AND FIRM PERFORMANCE IN TALKS WITH THE SOVIETS. END SUMMARY AND COMMENT.

3. ATMOSPHERICS. AS NOTED PREVIOUSLY (REFTEL A) ATMOSPHERICS AND PROGRAMMING OF SADDAM HUSSEIN'S VISIT TO MOSCOW (APRIL 14-15) SUGGEST THAT TALKS PRODUCED MINIMAL RESULTS. THERE IS INCREASING EVIDENCE THAT HIS VISIT WAS CUT SHORT. JORDANIAN EMBOFF TOLD US HIS EMBASSY WAS INFORMED BEFOR SADDAM'S ARRIVAL THAT VISIT WOULD LAST TWO DAYS. IN FACT STAY WAS JUST 24 HOURS. SADDAM DID NOT SEEN BREZHNEV AND THE IRAQIS FAILED TO CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 MOSCOW 05443 181945Z

HOST A RETURN DINNER FOR KOSYGIN. WHILE BOTH EVENTS COULD HAVE FALLEN VICTIM TO SOVIET PREPARATION FOR THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM APRIL 16, WE DOUBT THAT THIS IS THE WHOLE STORY.

4. ON SUBSTANTIVE SIDE SOVIET-IRAQI JOINT COMMUNIQUE AND WHAT WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO LEARN FROM DIPLOMATS HERE INDICATE THAT MAIN RESULTS WERE AS FOLLOWS:

A. BILATERAL AFFAIRS. BILATERAL ASPECTS OF THE COMMUNIQUE ARE LARGELY ANODYNE REITERATIONS OF THE PARTIES' INTENTIONS TO MAINTAIN, DEEPEN AND STRENGTHEN BILATERAL TIES. SIGNIFICANT RESULTS APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN FEW. CONSULAR CONVENTION AND AGREEMENT ON ATOMIC ENERGY (REFTEL A) CERTAINLY REPRESENT NO GREAT BREAKTHROUGH. ANNOUNCEMENT THAT THE PARTIES AGREED TO WORK OUT PROSPECTS FOR THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND TRADE ALSO APPEAR TO ENTAIL NO BINDING COMMITMENTS ON THE IRAQIS TO GUARANTEE SOVIETS INSIDE TRACK IN IRAQI ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. IN THIS CONNECTION JORDANIAN EMBOFF CLAIMED THE SOVIETS WERE VERY CONCERNED AND ANNOYED ABOUT IRAQ'S TURN TO WESTERN SUPPLIERS FOR MAJOR ECONOMIC CONTRACTS. HOWEVER, HE SAID THE IRAQI AMBASSADOR COMPLAINED SHORTLY BEFORE SADDAM'S ARRIVAL THAT IRAQ WAS "HAVING DIFFICULTY" IN GETTING THE SOVIETS TO MEET THEIR CONTRACTS. THIS SUGGESTS THAT THE IRAQIS WERE PREPARED TO TAKE A FIRM LINE IN THEIR ECONOMIC TALKS WITH THE SOVIETS.

B. ARMS SUPPLIES. ONLY POSSIBLE EXCEPTION TO WHAT OTHERWISE SEEMS FAIRLY STERILE BILATERAL EXCHANGE MIGHT BE IN THE ARMS FIELD. JORDANIAN TOLD US THAT IRAQI AMBASSADOR ALSO COMPLAINED RECENTLY ABOUT MOSCOW'S REFUSAL TO "MEET ITS COMMITMENTS" ON ARMS DELIVERIES. HOWEVER, JORDANIAN CLAIMED THAT TEN DAYS BEFORE SADDAM HUSSEIN'S ARRIVAL AN IRAQI MILITARY DELEGATION BEGAN TALKS HEREON SOVIET-IRAQI ARMS DELIVERS. AND WE NOTE THAT GENERAL KULIKOV AND THE IRAQI CHIEF OF STAFF TOOK PART IN THE TALKS WITH SADDAM HUSSEIN. IN THIS CONNECTION WE WOULD ASSUME THAT IF SOVIETS AND IRAQIS IRONED OUT ALLEGED PROBLEMS OVER ARMS, IRAQIS WOULD

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 MOSCOW 05443 181945Z

REGARD THE VISIT AS IMPORTANT SUCCESS.

C. IRAQ-IRAN AGREEMENT. COMMUNIQUE GIVES THE FIRST OFFICIAL SOVIET ENDORSEMENT OF SADDAM HUSSEIN'S AGREEMENT WITH SHAH. HOWEVER, THE SOVIETS' EXPRESSION OF "SATISFACTION" APPEARS THE VERY MINIMUM MOSCOW COULD PROVIDE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES. JORDANIAN EMBOFF SAID DISCUSSION OF THE AGREEMENT WAS IN FACT THE CENTRAL REASON FOR SADDAM'S VISIT. ACCORDING TO AN ACCOUNT HE RECEIVED FROM THE IRAQIS, SOVIETS ASKED--SHORTLY AFTER THE ALGERIAN AGREEMENT WAS ANNOUNCED--FOR AN IRAQI "REPRESENTATIVE" TO COME TO MOSCOW TO EXPLAIN "WHAT WAS BEHIND THE AGREEMENT." JORDANIAN SAID NON-IRAQI ARAB SOURCES TOLD HIM THAT THE SOVIETS WERE SURPRISED AT, AND SUSPICIOUS ABOUT, THE IRAQ-IRAN AGREEMENT AND ANGERED

THAT IT HAD TAKEN PLACE WITHOUT SOVIET-IRAQ "CONSULTATIONS." IN RESPONSE TO THE SOVIET REQUEST, ACCORDING TO THE JORDANIAN, IRAQIS INFORMED MOSCOW, IN A MOVE THE SOVIETS APPARENTLY DID NOT EXPECT, THAT SADDAM HUSSEN HIMSELF WOULD PROVIDE THE BRIEFING THEY WANTED. JORDANIAN CONCLUDED THAT IN HIS VIEW THE SOVIETS REMAIN UNCONVINCED THAT SOME "SPECIAL AGREEMENTS" OR SECRET UNDERSTANDINGS DO NOT EXIST BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN.

D. KURDISH QUESTION. COMMUNIQUE MAKES NO MENTION OF IRAQI SUCCESS IN DEALING WITH THE KURDISH PROBLEM. HOWEVER, ATTENTION GIVEN THE KURDISH SITUATION IN SPEECHES APRIL 14 INDICATES THAT THIS MATTER WAS CERTAINLY DISCUSSED. KOSYGIN'S REMARKS AND HIS REMINDER THAT MOSCOW SUPPORTED THE AUTONOMY PLAN OF 1970 SEEM UNLIKELY TO HAVE PLEASED SADDAM HUSSEIN. MOREOVER JORDANIAN, WHO RECEIVED COPY OF SADDAM'S TEXT FROM IRAQI EMBASSY, TOLD US THAT PRAVDA, WITHOUT ANNOUNCEMENT, ABBREVIATED THE LENGTHY STATEMENT WHICH SADDAM MADE ON THE KURDS. HE NOTED IN ADDITION THAT SADDAM'S POINTED REFERENCE TO "OUR KURDISH PEOPLE" WAS CERTAINLY MEANT TO INDICATE THAT BAGHDAD WOULD NOT TOLERATE INTERFERENCE IN IRAQ'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS.

E. INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS. COMMUNIQUE LANGUAGE ON THE ME SUGGESTS THAT THE SOVIETS AND IRAQIS MADE CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 05 MOSCOW 05443 181945Z

NO HEADWAY IN RESOLVING THEIR OBVIOUS DIFFERENCES OVER ME POLICY. THE CAREFULLY WORDED REFERENCE TO "LIBERATION OF ALL OCCUPIED TERRITORIES" (WITHOUT REFERENCE TO 1967 FRONTIERS) CONTINUES TO ALLOW EACH SIDE ITS OWN INTERPRETATION OF THE TERRITORIAL QUESTION. WE ALSO ASSUME THAT THE ABSENCE OF ANY REFERENCE TO GENEVA OR TO SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS REFLECTS IRAQI INFLEXIBILITY ON ME WHICH THE SOVIETS--PROBABLY ASSUMING A HOPELESS CAUSE--DID NOT WORK PARTICULARLY HARD TO CHANGE. THE SOVIETS, HOWEVER, APPARENTLY TONED DOWN IRAQI RHETORIC--AS DID SADDAM HUSSEIN'S APRIL 14 REMARKS--DIRECTLY CRITICIZING "U.S. THREATS" AGAINST OIL PRODUCERS. COMMUNIQUE DOES NOT MENTION U.S. DIRECTLY, THOUGH CRITICISM OF U.S. IS IMPLIED IN THE VIETNAM SECTION (REFTEL B).
STOESSEL

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: KURDS, ECONOMIC COOPERATION, ARMS SHIPMENTS, MINISTERIAL VISITS, BOUNDARY CLAIMS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 18 APR 1975
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: GarlanWA
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1975MOSCOW05443
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: X1
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D750137-0796
From: MOSCOW
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1975/newtext/t19750438/aaaabjgu.tel
Line Count: 217
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION EUR
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: LIMDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 4
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: LIMDIS
Reference: 75 MOSCOW 5288, 75 MOSCOW 5284
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: GarlanWA
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 20 MAY 2003
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <20 MAY 2003 by BoyleJA>; APPROVED <09 SEP 2003 by GarlanWA>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
05 JUL 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: SADDAM HUSSEIN'S MOSCOW VISIT BEIRUT PASS BAGHDAD
TAGS: PFOR, UR, IZ, (HUSSEIN, SADDAM)
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006